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Abstract
There has been an increasing interest in inferring some personality traits from users
and players in social networks and games, respectively. This goes beyond classical sen-
timent analysis, and also much further than customer profiling. The purpose here is to
have a characterisation of users in terms of personality traits, such as openness, con-
scientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. While this is an incipient
area of research, we ask the question of whether cognitive abilities, and intelligence
in particular, are also measurable from user profiles. However, we pose the question
as broadly as possible in terms of subjects, in the context of universal psychometrics,
including humans, machines and hybrids. Namely, in this paper we analyse the fol-
lowing question: is it possible to measure the intelligence of humans and (non-human)
bots in a social network or a game just from their user profiles, i.e., by observation,
without the use of interactive tests, such as IQ tests, the Turing test or other more
principled machine intelligence tests?
Keywords: intelligence; user profiles; cognitive abilities; social networks; universal
psychometrics; games; virtual worlds.
1 Introduction
Virtual environments created by games, social networks and virtual worlds are
different from natural environments in many ways. One remarkably property
is that there is freedom to detach the physical features of participants from the
virtual appearance. This means that it is relatively easy to impersonate anyone
and use anonymity. As a result, humans and bots can interact and participate
in these environments in similar conditions. In addition, virtual environments,
unlike real environments, usually record a great part of the things that happen
in the environment, as actions, conversations, etc. This means that (almost)
everything is recorded and can eventually tracked, processed and analysed af-
terwards. Consequently, virtual environments are an excellent playground to
analyse and compare the behaviour of humans and machines.
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User profiles are usually derived from the information that is constantly
recorded and archived, in terms of what the users do, say, buy, etc. This infer-
ence of user interests, intentions, characteristics, preferences, and ultimately be-
haviours, is usually known as ‘user profiling’. Of course, user profiling has been
common in many other areas —most especially when the user is a customer—,
much before virtual environments were common like today. However, virtual
environments record such an amount of information (as users ‘spend’ so much
time in them, or just connected through their gadgets) that it is now possible
to build very rich (and accurate) user profiles. Profiles usually integrate given
information (age, location, gender, etc.) with the inferred information (user
preferences, activities, ...). Some abilities have also (occasionally) been part
of the user profile, “both mental and physical” [23]. Very recently, some works
have started to predict personality traits or abilities [60, 22, 1, 64, 58, 51]. These
works have focussed on humans —more precisely, they have not questioned the
humanness of the profiles.
In this paper we analyse whether cognitive abilities in general, and intel-
ligence in particular are measurable when the users may be humans or bots.
In other words, and perhaps more interestingly, how easy is to fool these pre-
dictions when using machines instead of humans? Can we design a bot that
learns to create profiles such that their predicted cognitive abilities are placed
as desired? Can humans use these bots to look what they are not, e.g., more or
less intelligent?
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses how ma-
chine intelligence has been evaluated and briefly revisits the approach to evalu-
ate human and machine intelligence in an integrated, non-anthropocentric way.
Section 3 reviews ways of inferring intelligence (or, rather, humanness) by ob-
servation, but without using profiles. Section 4 discusses the central issue in
this paper, how intelligence can be inferred from user profiles in humans and
whether this is extensible to machines. Finally, section 5 finds several caveats
about this and the ultimate interest of the possibility of inferring intelligence in
this way.
2 Measuring cognitive abilities of humans and
machines: universal psychometrics
The evaluation of the cognitive abilities of biological beings has been been ad-
dressed by psychometrics [65, 4], for humans, and by cognitive science [63] and
comparative psychology, when animals are also considered. When talking about
machines, things are much more scattered and immature: specific tests (Turing
Test [66, 57], the total Turing Test [62] and other sensorimotor variations [56],
the Bot Prize [42], CAPTCHAs [68], the use of human IQ tests for machines
[16, 18, 17, 61, 6, 5] , the machine intelligence quotient [71, 2], ... ), compe-
titions (RL competition [70], Robocup [49], general game playing competition
[21], planning competition [54], ...) and landmarks (Deep blue [7], Watson [20]).
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The problems of the Turing Test and other non-systematic ways of evaluat-
ing machine intelligence have been spotted by many (see, e.g., [24]). Similarly,
the justification of why IQ tests are not for machines (or for biological sys-
tems other than humans) is more cumbersome [12]. The inadequacy of these
approaches has led to a more principled, non-anthropocentric approach of eval-
uating machine intelligence, usually based on concepts such algorithmic infor-
mation theory, Solomonoff prediction, the MML principle, compression, etc. we
refer to the following references for a comprehensive picture: [9, 10, 38, 11, 55,
24, 26, 25, 27, 52, 39, 30, 28, 45, 14, 33, 46, 53, 36, 47, 37, 44, 31, 32, 29, 13].
There is a notion that has emerged from the previous works: the idea of
a ‘universal (intelligence) test’, first illustrated in [30], as a test that could
be administered to any kind of subject, of any speed, and interrupted anytime.
The notion of a ‘test for all’ is appealing and soon generated widespread interest
[50, 3]. The extent and breadth of universal tests has been analysed in [13]. This
study suggests that there are many challenges to be solved if we really want a
most general test. However, the notion of evaluating humans, animals and
machines with the same principles has led to a new discipline called universal
psychometrics [35, 34], defined as the general evaluation of cognitive abilities of
any kind of subject (with or without universal tests).
One of the motivations for universal psychometrics has precisely been the
existence of a plethora of bots, agents, robots, hybrids and collectives thereof
and other kinds of artificial agents in social networks, games, messaging net-
works, virtual worlds and other Internet-based spaces. This increasing variety
of systems in an increasing variety of environments suggests more emphatically
that the CAPTCHA approach or the use of IQ tests is too anthropomorphic
and limited to determine intelligence appropriately.
3 Measuring intelligence without profiles
We will now focus on virtual environments and see the specific alternatives
here. The best way to evaluate the intelligence of an agent (be it a human or
a machine) in a virtual environment is to use an intelligence test (but not a
CAPTCHA or a Turing Test variant, as discussed above). Finding good tests
for this is the goal of universal psychometrics. Nonetheless, the question we
ask in this paper is whether we can evaluate intelligence from the behaviour
of the agents, without actually using tests on purpose. So we will review and
investigate how intelligence can be measured observationally without profiles
(below) and with profiles (in the next section).
We can explore whether there are other ways of (loosely) interacting with
or observing agents in order to get estimations of their intelligence (or related
traits). For instance, in games there is an increasing interest in the concept
of believability [43]. Several techniques are used to determine whether a bot
behaves like a human. This ends up falling back into the area of Turing Tests
for bots [41, 42] such as BotPrize [40], although it is not always suggests as
a test. As a result, this approach has the same benefits and inconveniences
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of the use of a Turing Test in other environments (e.g., the Loebner Prize).
On one hand, we can use intelligent judges to implement the test, and there is
flexibility on the issues or patterns the judges can look at. On the other, these
tests are getting increasingly easier to crack, the behaviour of the evaluee may
change because of the realisation of being examined, they are not automated
(as human judges are needed) and, more importantly, it is humanness what is
being measured instead of intelligence.
Similarly, we could think of CAPTCHAs [68] as an automated solution, but
they are still more anthropocentric than the Turing Test and evaluate some
human abilities which are poorly related with intelligence (such as reading dis-
torted text). Also, it is again a disruptive approach (if these tests are executed
regularly).
Alternatively, the principled approach represented by universal psychomet-
rics may be useful in games, since players can be evaluated with rewards, without
actually looking as a test. The problem is that intelligence is said to correlate
with performance on a variety of games (see, e.g., [30, sec. 6.5]), not only one
specific game. Also, in social networks, there is no clear notion of reward, as
people are just here for fun or for socialising, not for getting rewards.
From here, it seems difficult (if not impossible) to evaluate intelligence with-
out actually alienating the agent from its context and administering an intel-
ligence test on purpose. Is there any alternative? This is what we want to
explore in this paper, the possibility of estimating intelligence by examining
user’s profiles and logs. This is what we do next.
4 Measuring intelligence with profiles
A person can be judged by what she is able to do or what she has done. Intelli-
gence is usually associated to what she is able to do. Nonetheless, we frequently
infer abilities by looking at what has been done. In the context of virtual envi-
ronments, an agent creates a history, a log or, if properly arranged, generalised
and integrated by some user-provided information, a profile. From a user pro-
file, in a social network, a game or a virtual world, we can know what the user
does, how she talks, what she says, what friends she has, what things she like,
what she buys, etc. As said in the introduction, there is a strong interest in
extracting value from all this information in order to customise applications,
products and interfaces to this behaviour.
One kind of information that has been recently extracted from user profiles
is user personality, decomposed into several traits, such as openness, conscien-
tiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism1 [60, 22, 1, 58]. These
traits are extracted from what the user does, but they can also be inferred in a
more networked (or social) way, by using information about the user’s friends
[64]. In fact, this turns out to be a transductive problem (instead of an in-
ductive problem), as the correct categorisation of some users may be useful to
1The traits may vary depending on the model: the P.E.N. model, the Big Five or the
Alternative Five model.
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categorise her friends afterwards, who may be more difficult to categorise on a
first attempt.
Most interestingly, one recent work has included a very diverse set of traits,
including some ideological and personal ones, such as gender, political views,
drug addiction, sex orientations, etc., along with the above mentioned traits,
but also including intelligence [51]. This work shows that it is possible to infer
the user’s intelligence from her profiles, using a very simple linear model after
singular-value decomposition, yielding to a prediction with 0.39 of Pearson cor-
relation. This work highlights the high predictability of the “Likes” attribute:
“for example, the best predictors of high intelligence include ‘Thunderstorms,’
‘The Colbert Report,’ ‘Science,’ and ‘Curly Fries,’ whereas low intelligence was
indicated by ‘Sephora,’ ‘I Love Being A Mom,’ ‘Harley Davidson,’ and ‘Lady
Antebellum’.” While some of them may have some sense, such as ‘Thunder-
storms’ or ‘Science’, others may have a more difficult explanation, such as ‘Curly
Fries’. Independently from whether the model is understandable or not, it is
a fact that we can infer positively-correlated information about human user
intelligence with a few profile data. This possibility unveils many possible ap-
plications. In personnel selection, we can use this information to eliminate some
recruit tests during the selection process. In teaching and other academic areas,
this information can be used to better choose or customise assignments to the
particular student’s abilities. While the accuracy may be worse than on-purpose
intelligence test, the good thing about this approach is that it goes smoothly
and inadvertently for the subjects.
However, what happens when we consider non-human users as well? All
the previous studies do not consider this possibility. Certainly, if we use bots,
many good predictors will be less so. This is especially the case with current
technology, as any bot that is able to manage in a social network, a game or
a virtual world, will probably have a very special profile. This will be more
or less so depending on the variety of actions and communication that the
environment can offer. If natural language conversation exists in a free way (not
with a restricted set of phrases, as in some massive multiplayer online games
for children) then a much more complex analysis in terms of natural language
processing could reveal much more information that a mere “likes” analysis (or
other simple attributes) but will also be much more difficult. Also, in games,
the actions, strategies, and alliances may reveal part of the users’ intelligence.
In addition, the assessment or comments received by other users can also be a
good source of information. On occasions this could get closer to an informal
Turing Test, if some other users make (intentional or unintentional) judgements
about the user’s level of intelligence in their comments. Finally, in those cases
where users have some goals (e.g., games) or are asked to do something (working
teams), we could try to evaluate their performance or accomplishment in these
tasks, or at least what kinds of subgoals or subtasks the agent is able to accept
and those that the user rejects, in order to estimate their cognitive abilities.
Overall, there is a huge space of exploration in order to determine the in-
formation about user actions and conversation that may useful for estimating
intelligence. The attributes and information required may vary depending on
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the technology and the expected degree of bot intelligence, the existence of hy-
brids, etc. Of course, in any case, we would require some supervised data, i.e.,
some of the users (humans and bots) should be properly evaluated before, in
order to take them as a reference. While the evaluation of human intelligence
is reliable, the evaluation of machine intelligence is still in its infancy.
The previous picture shows a highly challenging problem. If the problem
can be eventually be solved by approximating (with some degree of reliability)
some cognitive abilities, then there may be some interesting applications when
thinking about humans and bots together. The most likely area of applica-
tion is when hybrid groups or teams must be created to accomplish a task: a
more appropriate selection of humans and bots can be performed if we have
an estimation of their cognitive abilities. Similarly, in games, we can use this
information to create teams such that the match or competition is more equili-
brated. On the other hand, if the problem cannot be solved in this way with any
minimal degree of reliability, this may also useful as a source of valuable and in-
teresting information for understanding why some predictors may only work for
humans while others might be more universal. This also suggests that it may be
more informative to use predictive techniques that yield comprehensible models,
such as decision trees or that indirectly convert model into comprehensible ones
[59, 8, 19, 15, 67].
5 Discussion
We have just explored the general question that gives name to this paper. The
possibility is challenging but may have interesting benefits if ever successful.
However, at this point, we have failed to make an assessment of its viability in
the short or long terms. In fact, we should not try to do this assessment without
considering some further difficulties. Next we comment on several caveats about
the approach of inferring intelligence using user profiles.
The first important caveat comes from the type of techniques that are usu-
ally employed for bots believability is desired. For instance, some bots are based
on “human traces”, such as [48]. These systems try to replicate “chunks” of
human behaviour. Locally, these chunks or traces may look consistent and,
if properly put together, may also look consistent globally as well. Not sur-
prisingly, this approach is a generalisation of how the first chatterbots worked,
as Weizenbaum’s Eliza [69]. The problem is that, at least initially, we expect
that the analysis of profiles is based on statistical criteria rather than semantic
ones. With this kind of analysis, the profile may be just an aggregation of the
chunk’s profiles, which may correspond to intelligent profiles (as extracted from
intelligent humans), while the bot clearly has no intelligence at all.
Another general problem (which is not only particular to machines) is that
users may be playing a role. This means that they may try to look more
intelligent than they really are (by, e.g., adding ‘science’ to their ‘likes’). It can
also be the other way round, as many may try to look less intelligent than they
really are to give a more sociable and accessible impression. Closely related, we
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also have the problem of impersonation, where the role played is to feign, and
not necessarily focussing on the cognitive abilities but rather on the personality.
Nonetheless, one of the most important caveats is when bots are not designed
to perform a given task or offering a service, but they are (also) conceived to
get good results in these intelligence estimations, i.e., to fool the estimations. A
good way of doing this is by looking at how the methods that infer intelligence
from user domains could work and learn from them. This ‘adversarial learning’
scenario would probably be endless, and resembles what is happening today
with CAPTCHAs, which need to be replaced as some bots are able to pass
them.
Another (related) problem of measuring in an uncontrolled setting is that
bots can use human computation. For instance, they could just ask what to do
or what to say to some human users. In fact, if they are able to verbalise their
objectives, they could exploit their network of friends to achieve their goals,
and look more intelligent. This issue also happens with CAPTCHAs, as some
malicious bots forward their CAPTCHAs to some specialised sites where they
are being passed by humans.
Conversely, humans could use machines to look more intelligent. This is
already happening in many contexts, as humans are currently enhanced by
calculators, smart phones, web search engines, encyclopaedias, translators, the-
saurus, puzzle solvers, etc. In a more sophisticated way, humans could use
machines to create any fake profile, by letting a bot do part of their actions and
even conversation. Bots are already used on some social networks to pretend
that the user is awake, or working, or doing some activity. The possibilities of
hybridisation (with either humans and bot taken the dominant role) are endless.
Despite all these caveats, the possibility of inferring intelligence or other cog-
nitive abilities from behaviour in a virtual environment deserves some attention.
Many bots are starting to be able to solve some specific tasks derived from com-
plex problems, where groups of people and artificial agents collaborate. Being
able to infer the intelligence (and other cognitive abilities) of all the partners in
a team or group may be very useful in order to allocate the most appropriate
tasks.
In more general terms, the interest in intelligence estimation from profiles
will probably be increased as bot intelligence gets closer and closer to (and
eventually beyond) human intelligence. For the moment, I think that this may
be a secondary (but interesting) scenario to better determine what universal
psychometrics can be and possibly refine the notion of universal test.
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